ABSTRACT
Classical liberals advocate widespread reliance on private property as a method for reducing commons problems, settling conflicts, and incentivizing cooperation. While recognizing that there is wide scope for reciprocal, spontaneous recognition of such boundaries, Buchanan contends that the state is necessary to prevent marginal defections from those accepted limits from unraveling such a tenuous social contract. Whether between individual property owners or club providers of governance problems, any non-monolithic society confronts some irreducible legal commons. Consider the differences between Buchanan's model of a unanimous social contract and Kukathas's model of a diverse liberal archipelago. Governance problems are shaped by technological, organizational, and social factors. Technologically, collective goods have different economies of scale. While recognizing that there is wide scope for reciprocal, spontaneous recognition of such boundaries, Buchanan contends that the state is necessary to prevent marginal defections from those accepted limits from unraveling such a tenuous social contract.
