ABSTRACT
An economic analysis of the causes of property crime begins with the basic idea that illegal or criminal behavior is a purposeful way in which individuals respond to their perceptions of economic opportunities. Thus, following Becker (1968, p. 176), we argue that at least some individuals engage in crime “not because their basic motivation differs from that of other persons, but because their benefits and costs differ.” The analytical framework employs the theory of traditional household choice, which rests on the principle of constrained utility maximization and implies rational behavior on the part of decision makers in response to perceived market incentives. In other words, some people engage in property crime because they have reason to expect that by doing so they can better their economic condition. Examples of this theoretical and conceptual framework is present in the research of Andreoni (1995), Block and Heineke (1973), Ehrlich (1970, 1973, 1974), Fleisher (1963, 1966a, 1966b), Sjoquist (1973), and Weicher (1970).
