ABSTRACT
Ancient Greek sceptics suspend judgment about all claims concerning how things really are. The question is what kinds of philosophical thinking that can allow. The chapter examines two models of philosophical thinking articulated by Greek sceptics, one by the Pyrrhonist Sextus Empiricus and the other by the Academic Carneades. On Sextus’ model, one lets oneself be passively swayed by the concepts and the habits of reasoning one has acquired (whether innately, through being raised in a certain culture, or through discussion with non-sceptical philosophers). This is a particular case of the general strategy Sextus adopts for living as a sceptic—namely, following the appearances; at no point does he endorse any claim concerning the truth, or the real nature of things. By contrast, Carneades is willing to accept some appearances as persuasive, that is, as having the feel of truth about them; and this feeling of truth can be increased by active investigation. A persuasive appearance is never guaranteed to be true, but the goal is to reach an impression of things that looks as if it is true to the greatest extent possible. One can go along with such impressions, whether in philosophy or in everyday life, without definitely asserting their truth. Finally, there are the question what Sextus himself counts as philosophy, and the question how close he regards his own thinking to that of ordinary people; he seems to be ambivalent on both, but this seems more problematic in the latter case than the former.
