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Moral pluralism and companions in guilt
DOI link for Moral pluralism and companions in guilt
Moral pluralism and companions in guilt book
Moral pluralism and companions in guilt
DOI link for Moral pluralism and companions in guilt
Moral pluralism and companions in guilt book
ABSTRACT
In this paper I examine Clarke-Doane’s suggestion that normative pluralism is untenable and argue that it should be rejected. To see this, I believe we need to examine not just our mathematical and normative beliefs, but also our perceptual beliefs. I’ll argue, first, that if Clarke-Doane’s suggestion holds for our normative beliefs, it also holds for our perceptual beliefs. That is enough, I suggest, to make normative pluralism a viable position. I then return to the mathematical case, and argue that the apparent difference in what pluralism implies for our deliberative practices in the mathematical vs. normative cases can be explained away.