ABSTRACT

This chapter describes a ‘companions in guilt’ (CG) / ‘companions in innocence’ strategy against Justin Clarke-Doane’s argument regarding moral pluralism. It sets out Clarke-Doane’s reasons for thinking that moral pluralism faces a special problem, focuses on his claim that it fails to settle an intimately related practical question, what to do. The chapter aims to develop a CG strategy against this view, which revolves around considering and rejecting Clarke-Doane’s claim that ‘we can only do one thing.’ It examines the CG strategy by considering Clarke-Doane’s reasons for rejecting another explanation for why what to do is left unsettled: it is short for what to do, all things considered. The chapter explores the debate in a larger context and by distinguishing moral pluralism’s ability to meet specific epistemological challenges from its general plausibility overall. It argues that his under-states the extent to which mathematical pluralism’s plausibility depends on its ability to influence the practical question what to believe.