ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses work in 'philosophical psychology' and moral philosophy, but it would be misleading, in view of controversies among philosophers, to suggest that it represents any 'agreed results' of philosophical inquiries. The term 'welfare' seems to carry a meaning, in ordinary talk about the welfare of individuals, different from what it carries in many recent discussions in which it appears in the expression 'social welfare'. The chapter argues that a useful concept of social welfare involves the concept of individual welfare, it behooves us to be clear about the latter notion before trying to define the former. The 'Shorter Oxford Dictionary,' among others, equates the meaning of 'welfare' with that of 'good fortune, happiness, or well-being; prosperity'. The chapter explains the concept or rational preference and then the alternative proposal. Of course, the rational-preference proposal leaves open the possibility that a rational want is never directed at anything but a pleasant state of consciousness or a pleasant activity.
