ABSTRACT
This chapter addresses the question of to what extent the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (PCT) was an important political actor in Poland in the period 1993–2015. A major indicator the study uses is the scope and means by which the PCT restricted the room for political manoeuvre of the parliament. The investigation is based on the empirical analysis of the data of the JUDICON project. The analysis suggests that party politics was a major factor behind the institutional strategy of the PCT in relation to parliament and the PCT adjudication. The PCT was activist when there was no clear majority in parliament and more deferential when a parliamentary majority succeeded in electing judges more amenable to the requirements of political governance. For most of the period under scrutiny, the PCT acted as a Kelsenian negative legislator, but its political neutrality was questionable. When it came to politically divisive issues, the judges acted in line with the preferences of the parties which had selected them, and in other cases they at least took into account political–partisan considerations. Despite the myth of an “activist court”, developed as a result of the PCT activities of the transition period (early 1990s), the parliament found methods to circumvent the barriers the Tribunal erected.
