ABSTRACT
This chapter explores the inconsistencies in psychiatry and law, both as to the definition of dissociative identity disorder (DID) and how a diagnosis of DID may be used by a defendant in the criminal justice system. It also explores the psychiatric literature on the meaning and content of DID. The chapter also explores relevant common-law cases on DID. It suggests a way forward in the DID debate. R. F. Schopp's point here is that only "competent practical reasoners" qualify as legally accountable agents in a liberal democratic society's criminal justice system and can be held criminally responsible for their actions. Experts are looking to the courts for a legal standard or pronouncement as to how, when they give evidence, to assist the courts concerning the criminal responsibility of DID sufferers. Although there seem to be problems with using the R v M'Naughten Rules to judge DID cases, there is one instance in which the modified Rules may be helpful.
