ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the author presents the relevant experiments, and then report on Adolf Grunbaum’s endorsement of the studies as indeed providing the evidence claimed. There are salutatory implications if she right in this part of her critique of Grunbaum’s critique. In Grunbaum’s claim that psychoanalysts should find no confirmation for their views in cognitive science findings regarding non-conscious mentation, he has apparently accepted the rather implausible notion that there are actually radically separate instantiations of the unconscious. In the author account the inference of an extant causally active, meaningful dynamic unconscious is perhaps the most basic of the presuppositions of the psychoanalytic general theory. Grunbaum states that there are associative problem-solving processes in the cognitive unconscious. However, Grunbaum contrasts these associative processes with the wish-driven “highly illogical” Sigmund Freudian dynamic unconscious. First Grunbaum attempts to undermine the concept of repression.
