ABSTRACT
This chapter critically examines Kant’s definition of intuition (Anschauung) as the (re)presentation of objects to the human mind, comparing and contrasting it with that of the Indian philosopher, Jiddu Krishnamurti, who claims that intuition is a form of intelligence by itself; it is neither identical to past experience nor dependent on it. The first section gives an introductory account of Kant’s epistemology, focusing on his theory of the two distinct features of human knowledge: concepts and intuitions. The second section inquires into the pattern of mental representation described in the philosophies of Kant and Krishnamurti. The third section analyzes the idea of intuition and its epistemic content as discussed by the two philosophers. The fourth section reinterprets intuition in terms of its cognitive role in generating human knowledge. Finally, the conclusion highlights various symmetries exhibited by the philosophies of Kant and Krishnamurti.
