ABSTRACT
A recent debate among Kant scholars concerns the possibility of non-conceptual content in intuition. Against the conceptualist reading of Kant’s theory of intuition, I defend a non-conceptual reading. Clarifying the distinction between intuition and perception in a Kantian context provides the basis for a better response to the debate between conceptualism and non-conceptualism. More precisely, I distinguish between content non-conceptualism (which does not require non-conceptual perceptions) and relational non-conceptualism (which does interpret non-conceptualism as a theory about perceptions) and argue that the former is more faithful to Kant than the latter. While it is, indeed, the case that (as conceptualism claims) Kant argues that intuitions must be conceptualized if they are to produce knowledge, Kant never claims that this fact prevents us from experiencing intuitions that are not (or that cannot be) so conceptualized; rather, it only means that the latter sort of intuitions have not obtained (and possibly could never obtain) the status of full-fledged perceptions.
