ABSTRACT
This chapter points out the case that favored the deposing of Muhammad Mussadiq. Many scholars have criticized the US and British policy vis-a-vis Mussadiq. Their arguments, in summary, are as follows: Mussadiq was a rare phenomenon in Iran in that he was both honest and a democrat. The US government was anxious to see, at least up to the visit to Washington in November 1952, that Mussadiq remain in office. The Mussadiq crisis of 1951-1953, and the first Iranian revolution, led to two contradictory and consequently misleading conclusions. First, the strength of nationalism and the need for foreign governments and commercial enterprises to come to terms with it were clearly demonstrated. The second point, however, is that foreign powers were nevertheless able to depose at will uncooperative governments in Third World countries. The latter was highly dangerous and led to grievous miscalculation in the 1956 Suez crisis when, as in Iraq in 1958, the former was ignored.
