ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that US Middle East policy from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s consisted primarily of safeguarding US interests by accommodating the populist pan-Arabism of Egyptian President Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser. After its initial attempt to bring together all regional actors in a grand pro-US alliance collapsed, Washington watched with dismay as Soviet influence appeared to advance, first in Syria and then in Iraq. Unfortunately for the United States, its four-pronged strategy soon fell victim to the conflicting objectives of other regional actors. Accordingly, US troops were landed in Lebanon to prop up the Christian Maronite government already besieged by pro-United Arab Republic (UAR) rebels, and British forces arrived in Jordan to stabilize the situation there. Ten days after the Iraqi coup, John Foster Dulles was still arguing that "the real authority behind the Government of Iraq was being exercised by Nasser, and behind Nasser by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)".
