ABSTRACT
James Gelvin finds the very word “spring” inappropriate in labeling the recent Arab protest movement, in part because it implies a new beginning, when the movement of 2011 is better seen as “the culmination of a decades-long struggle for human dignity in the region.” In part also, “spring” implies a time of joy and renewal, when in fact several of the uprisings have already “turned pretty sour.” Gelvin identifies four “transnational elements” that “made all states in the Arab world vulnerable to popular anger.” These elements are not specific to a given regime (which would make them “national”) but are endemic to the Arab world and are therefore “transnational.” They are not causes in themselves but are factors that have allowed the protests to burst forth as they have. First is the transition to neoliberal economies—free and open markets, privatized industries—as insisted on by international banks. Such economies force regimes to abandon the safety net of social services that they have historically provided to their citizens in an implicit exchange for the people’s quiet obedience. But when services disappear, so does the incentive to obey the regime. Other transnational elements include the potentially explosive combination of large and rapidly increasing populations of young people with a dearth of employment opportunities and a reliance on imported foodstuffs even as food prices soar. Gelvin also considers many Arab regimes to be “brittle”—they are inflexible in the sense that the people have no outlet for protest through popular representation in the government. Political expression is therefore all or nothing. Thus protests often begin by immediately demanding the downfall of the regime rather than simply promoting a change of representatives in government. In a provisional categorization of the courses taken by the wave of protests thus far, Gelvin finds that the military stood aside in Tunisia and Egypt, leading rapidly to the ouster of Presidents Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak, respectively. Two other leaders (in Libya and Yemen) gave way in regimes that effectively shattered from within, splintering between supporters and opponents of the besieged regime. Bahrain and Syria demonstrate a third path: the regime has knit itself together cohesively with sectarian and ethnic ties in order to withstand popular uprisings and meet them with force. The fourth category consists of five Arab monar361chies in which (thus far) public protest is muted and seeks limited reforms rather than radical transformations.
