ABSTRACT
Rational choice theory (RCT), an influential theory in the study of American politics and a well-established theory in the field of international relations, only gained sustained attention within comparative politics beginning in the early 1990s. This chapter presents a definition of RCT. It suggests that students of comparative politics should strive to assimilate the emphasis on actors and instrumental rationality that are a characteristic of RCT, but go beyond RCT and built a broader, encompassing theory of action. The chapter shows that the core theoretical principles of game theory are limited, both in terms of the domains where it is applicable and its explanatory power in the domains where it is applicable. Thus, in an effort to assess the strengths and weaknesses of game theory, it is best to focus on the essential underpinnings even of more advanced game theory: the three theoretical building blocks represented by the rules of the game, the expected utility model, and the concept of equilibrium.
