ABSTRACT

In his article “The Runabout Inference-Ticket” Professor A. N. Prior tries to show that there is an absurdity derivable from the theory “… that there are inferences whose validity arises solely from the meanings of certain expressions occurring in them.” 1 For accounts of the theory other than his own Prior refers us to the writings of K. R. Popper, W. Kneale, P. F. Strawson, and R. M. Hare. I shall not be concerned to determine whether he has accurately represented their versions of the theory (although I think this doubtful for example in the case of Popper), because Prior’s interpretation is itself intrinsically interesting. Prior’s argument strongly suggests that there is something wrong with the theory, as he presents it, but, unfortunately, he does not show us what is wrong with it. I wish to show (1) exactly where the theory, as stated by Prior, goes wrong, and (2) that the theory can be stated in such a way as to be quite sound.