ABSTRACT
This chapter argues for deontological ethics (DE) as a sound basis for global duties. A transcendental argument is outlined. It starts by taking the stance of asking for some moral good with universal authority (here called the ‘moral stance’). It is reasoned that for any such notion, it would also have to be regarded as morally good to pro-mote this moral good. Promoting the good, however, is only possible if we are free to do so. Consequently, if one takes the moral stance, then a fundamental demand follows, namely to protect and promote the freedom of all human beings to act morally (called ‘moral freedom’). The demand can be expanded to include all things necessary to support this freedom. A further argument is added as to why we have to aim at efficient and long-term realisations of what is morally demanded. This constitutes a second (empirical) level for DE and bridges the duty-teleological divide. It is then shown why an ethical theory of this type can withstand common criticisms against deontological ethics. It provides a reflectively robust basis for global duties, including duties toward future generations and the environment.
