ABSTRACT
This chapter highlights the structural impediments to reconciliation in the collapsed Somali state. Without embracing the fatalistic notion that the Somali conflict simply wasn't "ripe" for resolution and without excusing either mediocre UN efforts or myopic Somali leadership, it argues that from the outset, the Somali crisis presented domestic protagonists and international peacemakers with unique political dilemmas within a menu of very unpalatable options, all of which posed a high probability of failure. The road from the first, hopeful days of Operation Restore Hope in December 1992 to United Nations Operation in Somalia's (UNOSOM's) harried evacuation from Somalia in March 1995 is littered with the carcasses of failed peace conferences. Most of the Somali-sponsored peace initiatives between 1991 and 1995 were subnational in scope, typically cease-fire agreements between two rival clans or factions. The partial success of subnational peace processes reflects the fact that politics in contemporary Somalia has become intensely localized.
