ABSTRACT
The paper argues in favor of counterfactual causality and shows how such an analysis can be applied in the context of historical explanations. First, it is argued that the regularity thesis of causality misses altogether the point of causality, namely that causality implies change. The concept of a regular change presupposes the concept of change and causal change can be expressed by an adequate counterfactual. Second, because historical explanations are special forms of action explanations a concept of intentional action that includes an analysis of collective action is introduced. It is argued that historical explanations are causal explanations and that there are no serious problems concerning mental causation if a counterfactual analysis of causation is applied. Third, a special problem that evolves in historical explanations is discussed, namely the problem that the historical meaning of an event can change in the course of time. It is shown how a revised counterfactual analysis of causality can solve this problem.
