ABSTRACT
The aim of sanctions is ultimately to rehabilitate non-compliant states through a process of negotiation and bargaining. Historically, insurance prohibitions were not popular among drafters of sanctions. Still, insurance prohibitions were not regarded as a measure of general application. Insurance was viewed as an ancillary activity that did not have the potential to independently further the tripartite aim of sanctions, namely, to coerce, constrain or signal. The scope of the insurance prohibitions against Syria and Russia confirms the transition of insurance prohibitions from a tool of limited application to a regular measure, especially in political situations that call for decisive action. The analysis of the Syrian, Russian/Ukrainian and North Korea sanctions regimes demonstrates that insurance prohibitions follow closely the deterioration of the relations with targeted states. One might argue that illegality and sanctions are not a tricky combination because the European Union sanctions regimes often contain express prohibitions on providing insurance to designated persons and entities.
