ABSTRACT
The discussion about some emerging regional minilateral initiatives has never been detached from the issue of the centrality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and what they mean to the existing ASEAN-led regional cooperation. Much attention has been placed on one minilateral arrangement in particular—the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD) involving the United States, Japan, Australia and India. The QSD has attracted much global attention since its revival in November 2017 and is thought to be capable of challenging ASEAN centrality. But there are other minilateral initiatives, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, whose exclusion of ASEAN member states has not invoked special concern. This chapter addresses the predominant preconception that the QSD challenges ASEAN centrality and explains why this assumption is incorrect. Based on primary survey data and interviews conducted across the ASEAN region, the chapter shows that quantitatively more policy experts in the region think that the QSD does not challenge or compete with the existing ASEAN-led frameworks; instead it complements them. Moreover, the chapter sets the debate on ASEAN centrality in context, by highlighting that the notion of centrality—in terms of its geographical, diplomatic, institutional and strategic dimensions—has been challenged independently of the emerging minilaterals.
