ABSTRACT
In “Modality, Worlds, Essence, and Modal Knowledge,” Boris Kment develops his theory of modality and offers an account of how modal knowledge is possible. Kment first offers an analysis of metaphysical modality aimed at explaining the familiar links between modality and related notions, such as possible worlds, counterfactuals and essence. In “Gettier’s Thought Experiments,” Joachim Horvath proposes a suppositional reconstruction of Gettier’s thought experiments and raises some worries about Timothy Williamson’s competing counterfactual account. In “Challenges for an Experimentalist’s Skepticism about Cases,” Margot Strohminger and Juhani Yli-Vakkuri assess Edouard Machery’s critique of the method of cases (the usage of thought experiments in philosophy) in view of his research in experimental philosophy. In “In Defense of Modest Modal Skepticism,” Edouard Machery responds to Strohminger and Yli-Vakkuri and clarifies his views voiced in Philosophy within Its Proper Bounds.
