ABSTRACT
Greece’s position towards the EU’s enlargement to the Western Balkans remains ambivalent: on the one hand, Greece remains declaratively one of the most ardent supporters of integrating the whole Balkan region into the EU; on the other hand, Greece is also a persistent obstructing factor whenever its multiple interests in the Balkans produce friction. We investigate this ambivalent position to understand its origins. We argue that Greece’s position can be understood with reference to three key factors: (a) the particularities of Greece’s foreign policy-making and its persistent traits, (b) the background of Greece’s relationship with the region and the legacy of multiple disputes that were created or exacerbated in the early post-Communist period and (c) the legacy of turning EU enlargement policy into a Greek foreign policy tool during the 1990s. These factors not only explicate the existence and persistence of Greece’s ambivalent policies, but also are likely to continue to shape Greece’s enlargement policy in the future. In that context, we expect that Greece will engage in a delicate balance of, on the one hand, strategically placing conditionality to ensure favourable compromises with neighbours, and, on the other, not jeopardizing the continuation of the enlargement process per se.
