ABSTRACT
Persistence is mainly discussed by metaphysicians in either of two senses. First, there is the question of how things manage to persist through time per se—i.e., of what happens when something exists at different times. Second, there is the issue of persistence conditions—of which changes a given thing can undergo while surviving, i.e., while staying the same. Although both debates have connections with issues of essentialism and essentialist claims, these are significantly more manifest and direct in the case of the latter debate. This chapter will thus mainly focus on the issue of conditions of persistence. Such an issue presents metaphysicians with several puzzles and theoretical problems. Among these, the focus here will be on two of such riddles that are most tightly connected with essentialism—in particular, on two that can be answered exactly by endorsing some essentialist claim. The discussion of those riddles on the one hand, and of their essentialist solutions on the other will also give us a chance to appreciate the distinction between the notion of an essential property and that of an individual essence. The latter notion will be related to the issue of individuation, for which it plays a crucial role.
