ABSTRACT
This chapter examines and defends the work of American moral psychologist Professor James Rest, specifically his four component model (FCM) designed to understand and improve moral behaviour. Deriving from his 1980s to 1990s empirical work, Rest identified four psychological processes that must happen for ethical behaviour to occur: interpretation, judgement, decision (or motivation), and implementation. If one of these elements is missing, ethical lapses can and do take place. The FCM is not merely representational; it is also instructive. Institutions can enhance ethical behaviours if they can increase in individuals the qualities and motivations needed for each of the components.
However, in large part because of a general hesitancy towards empirical, behaviouralist approaches, Rest’s work has been largely ignored by legal ethicists where the discipline is dominated by moral and political approaches. The rationale is that behavioural approaches cannot tell us about the validity of moral judgements, and may even be used by lawyers, for example, to absolve poor behaviour or avoid practical reasoning altogether. The FCM has also been challenged by theorists from within its own discipline of psychology, more specifically, for its empirical validity, its emphasis on reason (as distinct from emotion or intuition) as central to ethical decision-making, and its overly internal, individualistic focus (when we know situation and context are critical factors).
After laying out the FCM and its context, our chapter offers responses to the critiques levelled from both the legal ethics and psychological fields. It demonstrates that, notwithstanding these criticisms, the FCM is a theoretically sound, essential resource for legal ethics. We outline the ways in which the FCM has been enhanced to include situational and affective dimensions more explicitly (so addressing the main concerns). Our final section outlines the FCM’s many uses for legal ethics scholarship, practice, and pedagogy.
Our chapter argues that this reticence about the place of social sciences in the field of legal ethics means that perennial cognitive and situational factors causing ethical failures are not properly understood or practically addressed, by legal educators, lawyers, and reformers. Philosophical inquiry might give better answers to what one ought to do, but a behavioural ethical approach can then help explain and resolve gaps between knowing what one ought to do and actually doing it.
