ABSTRACT
R. Forst’s analysis constitutes one of the most systematic and comprehensive attempts to explore the link between power and reasons. Forst defines power as follows: ‘the phenomenon of power is noumenal in nature: to have and to exercise power means to be able—in different degrees—to influence, use, determine, occupy, or even seal off the space of reasons for others. In a nuanced way, Simon Susen explores whether Forst’s definition of power precludes important constituent elements raised by those debates. While acknowledging this Enlightenment heritage, Matthias Kettner argues that Forst’s conceptualization of power presupposes an over-rationalistic view of human agency. Forst’s response opens with a generous acknowledgement of his gratitude to his interlocutors for this stimulating debate. By expanding the scope of his conceptualization of power, Forst rebuts critique from Clarissa Rile Hayward, Albena Azmanova, and Steven Lukes, to the effect that he does not adequately theorize structural and systemic power.
