ABSTRACT
Oddly enough in most collections, Cartesianism of any variety is like that unwelcome guest that just doesn’t quite fit in. In a collection on the soul and its origins, Cartesianism fits quite nicely. In fact, Cartesianism is neither the outlier (as with hylomorphism) nor will it be perceived by some as the most extravagant position (as with metaphysical idealism). What we all share (except for Turner’s hylomorphism) finds a most habitable home with Cartesianism (and possibly idealism), namely the fact that persons are, or have, souls and can potentially exist disembodied. This conversation, then, is unlike most conversations occurring today in philosophical and theological anthropology. In this way, the contributors have achieved two important objectives. First, they have helped shore up the reasons why talk of souls cannot be dismissed in philosophical and science-engaged theological discussions about human beings. Second, they have helped move discussions back in the direction of where the tradition and most of history finds its footing and focus. This is a positive development away from materialisms that are a dead end, and, as Gordon puts it—a “heresy” (or at least, something near it!).
