ABSTRACT
The paper addresses the fundamental issue of the morality of terrorism. It distinguishes four types of terrorism—‘predatory,’ ‘retaliatory,’ ‘political’ and ‘moralistic’—and argues that in all of them terrorism (in a ‘descriptive,’ value-neutral sense of the word) is always wrong. After a short introductory section the paper considers in some detail the conceptual problem of defining ‘terrorism’. Next it considers the possible application to terrorism, with the necessary modifications, of two main conditions of a ‘just war’; viz. the Principles of Discrimination and of Proportion. It argues that these conditions support the paper’s central contention. Additional support is then found in the concept and principles of human rights. In the final section the paper evaluates utilitarian arguments brought forth by Kai Nielsen in Violence and Terrorism: its uses and abuses, in support of so-called ‘revolutionary terrorism’.
