ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the author distinguishes four types of evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) that can be directed against both moral and theistic beliefs and examines how these two kinds of beliefs fare against those different EDAs. By my lights, theistic beliefs are overall less liable than moral beliefs to be undercut by EDAs. For, although both kinds of beliefs fare equally well—or equally poorly—against the companions in guilt argument, theistic beliefs fare better than moral beliefs against the counterfactual argument, the explanatory argument, and the probabilistic argument. The author argues, however, that this conclusion is drawn on the assumption that the epistemology of moral beliefs is to be considered independently of the epistemology of theistic beliefs. But if one focused on theistic moral belief, and hence considered the possibility of God ensuring the reliability of our moral belief-forming processes, then moral beliefs might inherit the suggested advantages that theistic beliefs have against EDAs.
