ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the way Kant transforms the older, hierarchical notion of dignity into the essentially egalitarian notion of dignity we know today. The chapter starts with a discussion of the Roman notion of dignitas, with its focus on highly stratified social status, personal duty, and reputation. It then argues that a crucial development in the understanding of dignity took place in the early modern period, when neo-Roman republican thinkers maintained that dignity requires a person to be ‘sui iuris’, i.e., free from domination. In doing so, they turned dignity into a largely binary notion, juxtaposing the dignity of a freeman with the wretched condition of a slave. The chapter then turns to Kant’s introduction of dignity in the Groundwork. It demonstrates that, when Kant grounds the moral agent’s dignity in his/her status as a law-giver in a Commonwealth of Ends, Kant is relying on this same binary understanding of dignity. The significance of this anti-slavery theme is further underlined by the pains Kant takes to ensure that God’s status within the Commonwealth of Ends is consistent with the dignity of human beings. Lastly, the chapter draws out an important implication of Kant’s account, namely that taking up the practical perspective necessarily commits a person to recognizing his/her own dignity as well as that of others.
