ABSTRACT
Principal-agent theory, tells us that as “change agents,” diaspora are “delegated” by host-states (the principal) some element of authority in decision-making and resource allocation (such as remittance flows). If this delegation of authority is problematic, it is because diasporas will often know more about local homeland situations than the host-state. In essence, diaspora network development raises a fundamental problem of information asymmetries, in that diasporas with local knowledge enjoy a distinct advantage over host-states that provide policies, resources and institutional mechanisms (directly or indirectly depending on positionality) to support such activities. Diasporas function with unwritten ground rules (UWGs) that, depending on the kind of relations between home and host-state, guide their behaviour either outside institutionalised relational frameworks or within them. Detailed analysis of the mechanisms, tactics and fundraising that diaspora networks rely on will not only improve our knowledge of these UWGs but will also help us understand how positionality favours some kind of diaspora activity over others. Since the incentives to deploy UWGs and to engage in fragile states vary from case to case and within the group, comparative analysis is warranted.
