The main argument presented in this chapter is that when we ascribe an identity to an object or a person, we assume that there is some quality of that object that is definitive. Changing this would involve a charge of arbitrariness against such identity ascriptions. Taking the same argument in a wider context, the author argues that caste hierarchies involve the same mechanism of identity ascription. Certain qualities are assumed arbitrarily as definitive of the people belonging to a particular caste. These labels are then ascribed to people as definitive, which then subjects them to certain socio-political power structures that are constructed on the basis of those identity ascriptions. This could be an important way of understanding the genesis of epistemological foundations of caste identities. This chapter further argues that Mahāyāna critiques of orthodox Indian realist schools of thought, spanning from Nāgārjuna to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, provide much richer ground to explore some of the most compelling arguments that hit right at the roots of such epistemological foundations of caste hierarchies in comparison to their Therāvādi counterparts.