ABSTRACT
The doctrine of minimum force is deeply engrained across policing scholarship and practice. To understand its origin, writers typically look to the 1829 creation of the New Police in London, and “Peel’s Principles.” Despite being little more than assertions about policing and human nature, with an uncertain provenance, the principles remain enormously influential for policing across Western jurisdictions.
An overriding expectation of minimum force is clear and conceptually consistent. By contrast, its operationalization, in the particular context of policing interactions, is more ambiguous. In many jurisdictions, police uniforms and practices have become increasingly militarized, and there is growing pressure for officers to take a more aggressive approach in their dealings with potential offenders.
Using historical and discursive analysis, this chapter explores the doctrine of minimum force and the interlocking concepts of policing by consent and police legitimacy. We highlight the surprisingly flimsy theoretical underpinning of minimum-force policing and examine, in particular, the interaction with the routine arming of officers. We expose key weaknesses in its theoretical and evidentiary base and highlight a need to strengthen the empirical understanding of minimum-force policing.
