ABSTRACT
Schopenhauer's references to Rousseau's views on pity suggest that these views in some way influenced his own theory of how compassion forms the basis of ethics. Although there are some similarities between the role and the status that both philosophers assign to the same empathetic emotion in relation to moral motivation and action, the chapter also identifies a fundamental difference. This difference concerns a stronger claim that Schopenhauer can be seen to make in connection with compassion's power to motivate moral actions. For Schopenhauer, compassion can motivate individuals to act in ways that are incompatible with their concern for their own preservation and well-being, whereas for Rousseau pity can never completely override self-love. The chapter goes on to relate Schopenhauer's stronger claim to his account of human character and his account of society in such a way as to introduce a theme with which Rousseau engages but that Schopenhauer appears largely to ignore, namely, how society can shape individuals as well as being shaped by them.
