ABSTRACT
Schopenhauer's theory of consciousness (which is also a theory of self-consciousness) is centered on the doctrine of the primacy of the will and the secondary nature of the intellect (or of cognition). The way in which Schopenhauer understands this doctrine involves the claim that, in the case of human animals, the “form of life” includes not only desire and suffering, but also death and boredom. Given that Schopenhauer makes this form depend on time as the form of self-consciousness, there must be an intrinsic connection between his views on time and his views on death and boredom. Whereas his views on desire and suffering (or pain) have already been extensively dealt with in the secondary literature, his reflections on death and boredom, particularly in connection to time and the form of life, seem to be less well-known, and are perhaps more elusive. The chapter focuses on this connection and pursues the additional, but secondary, aim of showing that subsequent developments of Schopenhauer's ideas—especially in Nietzsche's and Heidegger's works—help illuminate, in retrospect, the former's groundbreaking reflections on (self)-consciousness, time, death, and boredom.
