ABSTRACT
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the role of reflective judgments in Kant’s theory of epistemic normativity. Konstantin Pollok, in his book Kant’s Theory of Normativity, seems to restrict epistemic normativity merely to the domain of the conceptual rules of the faculty of understanding. In contrast to him, I would like to argue that, beyond the conceptual rules of the faculty of understanding, the normative function of reflective inferences of the teleological power of judgment is also crucial not only for biology or history but also for physics, in order to constitute our knowledge of the physical world as an organic and unified system. This chapter is divided into four parts. First, I will argue in what sense theoretical judgments about physical nature can be considered normative even though nature is the realm of what actually is and not the realm of what ought to be. Second, I will discuss the normativity of the two kinds of causality: real and ideal. Third, I’ll examine the normative function of the concept of the purposiveness of nature when it is applied to two different domains: that of organic beings and that of physical science. Finally, I conclude by stressing the specific normative role of reflective causal inference in physical theories.
