ABSTRACT
Now, most recent philosophers who have dealt with our topic have been shy about making proposals of a normative sort, not only about how we should act but even about how we should think and speak. The concept of morality and the words ‘moral’ and ‘morality’ seem to me to be eminently cases in point. Neither does it seem wholly forced when eighteenth-century writers call egoism a ‘scheme of morality’. Of course, there is a fourth possibility – to give up the use of the words ‘moral’ and ‘morality’. Both Hare and Falk remark that the question how to use the words ‘moral’ and ‘morality’ is ‘only a terminological question, albeit one to which some answers can gravely mislead’. There is one consideration, suggested by Falk himself, which makes me hesitate to include the notion of definitiveness or supremacy in the definition of a morality.
