ABSTRACT
The central task to which contemporary moral philosophers have addressed themselves is that of listing the distinctive characteristics of moral utterances. Two points need to be made about this example. The first concerns the function of ‘I ought to do so-and-so’ when it is used to announce a decision in a case like that of Sartre’s pupil. Secondly, it might be argued that the very possibility of a problem such as that of Sartre’s pupil presupposes the acceptance of certain universalizable maxims as moral principles. More commonly, however, non-universalizable judgements occur when a man finds that the concept of ‘duty’ has limits which render it useless in certain situations of moral perplexity. Crucial to the argument so far that universalizability is not a necessary characteristic of all moral valuation has been the distinction between first person and third person uses of moral valuation. The essence of moral judgements it might be said is their impersonality.
