ABSTRACT
The theory of moral reasoning which Mr Hare expounds in this book is presented as an attempt to resolve a dilemma or antinomy which, as he maintains in his opening paragraphs, confronts anyone who is faced with a serious moral problem. The solution is in terms of theory of moral judgements as a class of universalizable prescriptive judgements which was introduced in The Language of Morals. The main defect in Hare’s treatment of akrasia is that the key concept of ‘psychological compulsion’ is left undefined, and in particular that no criteria are suggested for differentiating it from simply not wanting to act on one’s principle more than one wants to contravene it. In majority of cases this argument will do all that Hare claims for it. It remains only to add that in his final chapter Hare gives a penetrating analysis of some kinds of bad argument and false assumption which are commonly produced in attempt to justify immoral conduct.
