ABSTRACT
This paper reviews those elements of the current non-proliferation regime which bear on reprocessing and plutonium use. A non-proliferation framework is suggested which would recognize that some reprocessing and plutonium use will take place in the years ahead. The paper concludes that an international consensus on effective and common criteria for reprocessing and plutonium use is highly desirable and might be based on: (a) a recognition that reprocessing and the resulting separated plutonium pose a proliferation risk which merits specific measures to minimize that risk; (b) while respecting the sovereignty of nations and their development needs, a recognition that reprocessing should take place only when, where and to the extent justified by national or multinational programmes; (c) a recognition that criteria should be developed by the international community concerning the ‘where’, ‘why’, ‘how much’ and ‘how’ of reprocessing and plutonium use; (d) a commitment by the countries concerned to ensure that international safeguards can be effectively applied to reprocessing facilities, plutonium stores and other facilities where plutonium is used, and (e) a commitment to apply adequate physical protection measures. Such a consensus would provide a framework within which the internationalization of certain fuel cycle activities could take place.
