ABSTRACT
The paper reviews present regulation of the international nuclear market. It emphasizes the need to reconsider the policy of unilaterally imposed restrictions and xxito prepare the ground for negotiation of mutually accepted restraints by suppliers and importers. The importance of extending the coverage of the non-proliferation regime is emphasized, and an international arrangement to be substituted for bilateral reprocessing controls is suggested. Possible elements for such an arrangement are: (a) a scheme for international plutonium storage, co-location of fuel cycle facilities; (b) prohibition of the release of plutonium in pure form; (c) restrictions on the number of reprocessing plants, and (d) improved safeguards. The policies of technology denial are also discussed, emphasizing that embargoes may well prove counter-productive in the long run and indicating that a softening of embargoes may be thought of in combination with better export controls to reduce the grey market, longer trigger lists and stepped-up sanctions against countries violating the non-proliferation obligations. Finally, the need to clarify the functions of international safeguards is observed.
