ABSTRACT
It is desirable to find a way of controlling the use of plutonium so that the legitimate aspirations of states to develop fuel cycles using it can be realized, while offering reassurance against a further spread of plutonium-based weapons. International control under a scheme for international plutonium storage (IPS) would be a measure added to safeguards at a stage that is particularly vulnerable to diversion. Detailed proposals for an IPS scheme are now being prepared by an IAEA Expert Group. In this paper the author gives a personal account of the proceedings. Among the Expert Group’s proposals is that all plutonium separated in states party to an IPS scheme should be registered with an IPS controlling body. Plutonium excess to states’ immediate requirements for specified and safeguarded use in reactors or research would then be placed in internationally controlled storage at reprocessing and fuel fabrication plants. The operator of the co-located plant would be a joint keyholder of the storage vault with international officers stationed at the site. Plutonium would be released with the authorization of the controlling body or delegated officers, provided that the material was to be covered by IAEA safeguards and a checking procedure showed that the plutonium requested would be absorbed rapidly by the proposed use. The state would be under an obligation to return material, not taken into the authorized use, to international storage. The end use would be verified.
