ABSTRACT
Multinational arrangements for ‘sensitive’ fuel cycle processes (enrichment and reprocessing) are distinct from, and more difficult than, arrangements to control ‘sensitive’ materials. Because they touch economic and industrial interests so closely, they must offer economic and industrial benefits commensurate with their non-proliferation effects. In the non-proliferation context, they can reinforce international safeguards as a means both of deterring national abrogation of commitments and of demonstrating exclusively civil intentions. In the industrial context, as existing process consortia demonstrate, they can offer a variety of advantages over independent national activity. Their non-proliferation and industrial benefits must, however, be balanced and related by reference to consistent criteria of restraint, viability, symmetry and parsimony. At the same time, the vexed issue of technology transfer must be faced, bearing in mind that the choice may be between deferred but uncontrolled dissemination of ‘sensitive’ technology and deliberate transfers under multinational regulation. In addition, process arrangements must be seen to meet the needs of an actual market, and, in their institutional forms, to offer scope for industrially realistic choice by participants and others. Unless they achieve such flexibility, national enrichment and reprocessing programmes will inevitably multiply.
