ABSTRACT
Existing arrangements appear inadequate to contain proliferation in a situation where non-nuclear weapon states have control over plutonium and reprocessing plants. However, continued development of thermal plutonium recycle and fast breeders is necessary as an insurance against the possibility that uranium supply may be inadequate to meet the demands in the early part of the next century. The plutonium dilemma is to find a way of allowing the technical development effort to proceed without prejudicing the willingness of states to develop and participate in new non-proliferation arrangements. It is suggested that a realistic international plutonium policy would seek to confine plutonium recycle and fast breeder technical development to a few large states, while promoting international efforts to develop arrangements within which nuclear power programmes utilizing plutonium recycle and fast breeder reactors could proceed without posing unacceptable proliferation risks. The international efforts would be directed to strengthening the political fabric of the existing non-proliferation regime, to building confidence in the long-term security of nuclear supply, to seeking agreement on technical and institutional arrangements for plutonium activities, to planning and providing multinationally controlled reprocessing facilities and to replacing bilateral export controls by obligations embodied in multilaterally agreed instruments.
