ABSTRACT
In trying to clarify some concepts in the present discussions, the paper points out that nuclear proliferation not only raises the risk of nuclear war, but is undesirable because it upsets the international balance. Both the possession by a state of nuclear weapons as well as the mere fact that it has certain sensitive installations that may give it the capacity to make such weapons are relevant. The non-proliferation regime xixis essential to dispel suspicions that such installations are being abused. The first proposals for an international non-proliferation regime, made in 1946, foresaw the need for physical control of certain nuclear facilities. The IAEA, established 10 years later, does not have the far-reaching mandate of the body originally proposed, but has the statutory mandate to assume some measure of control. Its principal non-proliferation function is the application of safeguards designed to detect non-compliance with an undertaking not to use specified nuclear items for the manufacture of nuclear explosives. Efforts are being made to strengthen the non-proliferation regime by extending safeguards coverage, finding less proliferation-prone fuel cycles (INFCE) and introducing control measures to prevent possible abuse. The ultimate safeguard lies in the effective multilateral control of operations involving special fissionable material. It is this control which should be central to a discussion of the purposes of ‘internationalization of the fuel cycle.’
