ABSTRACT
The rationale behind the original hypothesis was that subnational constitutions were pre-existent in aggregative federations. The expectation was that, in the federal bargain, such state entities (SNEs) would keep their original constitutional powers, including powers to determine their own constitutions and to legislate on matters not exclusively placed within the jurisdiction of the federation. SNEs in some multinational systems have strong self-constituent capacity. The hypothesis formulated in the introduction assumed that if SNEs have only weak or very weak subnational constitutional autonomy, this is compensated through representation. The hypothesis need not imply that, conversely, SNEs in systems with strong subnational constitutional autonomy are not also strongly involved in central constitution-making. The hypothesis is confirmed in three out of five countries: Belgium, India and South Africa, where (very) weak or medium constitutional autonomy is compensated by enabling strong involvement in central constitution-making.
