ABSTRACT
This concluding chapter summarises the analyses set out in the other chapters of the book and offers a theory of illiberal legality, i.e., the version of the Rule of Law in illiberal constitutionalism.
Against the background explored in the book, this chapter confirms that the Rule of Law does have the same meaning in the in-group, i.e., legal and cultural community and in the state examined. Illiberal constitutionalism features, amongst other things, ‘illiberal legality’. Illiberal legality emphasises the instrumental use of domestic law in both legislation and the application of the law. Another characteristic is the weak constraint that the European Rule of Law poses on the domestic public power because it requires the implementation and application of the EU law, i.e., both the values and the acquis. It also entails a special and distinct societal and value-oriented bedrock, which is different from that of the more advanced Western societies that are still able to maintain their substantive constitutional democracy, regardless of the challenges they face, such as the rise of populism. As a conclusion, which will answer the central question of the book, the chapter finds that there are two alternative implications of a situation in which a legal and cultural community is not able to maintain and enforce its legal regime: either the universality of its legal values and principles can be justifiably questioned, even if there is no common understanding concerning the definition of the Rule of Law, or the country whose actions challenge the universality of a principle and value has already ceased to be a part of that community.
