ABSTRACT
It is a truism that the principle of a possible first use of nuclear weapons, which underlies North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) strategy of ‘flexible response’, has a number of strategic, political, and, last but not least, ethical shortcomings. However, this does not necessarily mean that the simple antonym of first use, that is, the adoption of a commitment to no-first-use, would automatically remedy all of them. The most salient proposal, incorporating a collateral measure, aims at substituting the threat to use nuclear weapons first by strengthening NATO’s conventional defence. Still, the idea of upgrading NATO’s conventional capabilities should not be entirely rejected. It is useful and highly desirable if it contributes to raising the nuclear threshold and thus helps to transform the traditional first-use concept into the principle of non-early-use of nuclear weapons. According to present NATO doctrine, nuclear weapons will be used “as late as possible, however as soon as necessary”.
