ABSTRACT
This contribution problematizes the concept that the Chinese state is the most important, if not the only, variable in explaining the success of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects. The fact that China opens its arms to any interested parties in joining the BRI does not tell us anything about China’s exact impact in targeted states. The domestic structure approach that has been developed by some political scientists to analyze transnational advocacy networks or interest group politics can be useful for analyzing the BRI’s influence. In addition, a constructivist approach provides some insights into this matter. Framing and justifying the BRI as relevant to a recipient state’s infrastructure or developmental projects demand substantial effort. The concept of the BRI has to match norms and identities in the recipient state. These framing processes are as important as the actual negotiations between the Chinese investors and local stakeholders. This chapter proposes several hypotheses derived from the aforementioned theories and tests them with empirical examples drawn from Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), and even countries that are not on the traditional routes where China’s “Belt” and “Road” will pass, such as Finland.
