ABSTRACT
In Smith there is something of a contrariety, or double doctrine, on justice: much of his writing leaves us with the impression that we should use justice and its cognates to mean commutative justice, and only that. But much also authorizes the conclusion that we should embrace and talk of three different senses of justice. I exposit the three senses of justice, but leave aside Smith’s intentions in leaving us with such diverging impressions. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he distinguishes and describes commutative justice, distributive justice, and a third justice a name for which he does not give but is here called estimative. Smith shows that commutative justice is very special, yet he affirmed and abundantly practiced justice talk beyond commutative justice. According to my tri-layered interpretation, estimative justice looms large in matters determined by the jural “superior,” that is, the governor. I believe that Smith denominates such matters not in terms of distributive justice, but rather in terms of estimative justice (as well as commutative justice).
